Turkey´s Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament
Turkey attaches particular importance to arms control and disarmament issues. An active participation in international efforts in these areas, adherence to the relevant international agreements and observance of their full implementation, as well as maintaining the coordination among relevant institutions are important elements of Turkey’s national security policy. As a result of the momentous changes that took place in the European security architecture over the last decade, the general aspiration for a new security system based on cooperation has given a fresh impetus to arms control and disarmament endeavours, which was welcomed by Turkey.
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their delivery means is a growing tangible threat in the 21st century. Easy access to these weapons through trafficking and willingness of some states to cooperate with terrorist, extremist or organized crime groups increase the concern that such weapons might end up in illegal hands. In the light of the threatening dimension of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Turkey sincerely desires to see that all countries will come to share the goals of non-proliferation and collectively work towards a safer and more stable world. In this vein, Turkey has welcome the UN Security Counsil Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Turkey, regularly reports to and contributes to the work of the Committee established pursuend to the UNSC Resolution 1540.
Turkey does not provide any form of support and/or assistance to Non-State Actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transfer or use WMD and their means of delivery and fully supports all international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD.
The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for Turkey. Since Turkey is situated close to regions posing high risks of proliferation, she monitors with vigilance the developments in this field and takes part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse this alarming trend. Turkey attaches great importance to arms control and non-proliferation treaties and also to export control regimes as means to prevent such proliferation. In this context, in order to follow the developments and enable an effective exchange of views in the field of non-proliferation regarding Turkey’s obligations; regular meetings are held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the participation of representatives of all related institutions.
Turkey became party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2000. Turkey is also party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention since 1997 and the Biological Weapons Convention since 1974. In 1996, Turkey became the founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement regarding export controls of conventional weapons and dual-use equipment and technologies. Turkey joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zangger Committee in 1999, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group which seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons, in 2000.
Within the framework of the VII. article of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the national act (no. 5564) on “Prohibition on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons” entered into force at the end of 2006.
In line with her general stance against proliferation of WMD, Turkey has declared her support to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which was launched by the President of the USA during a speech in Krakow, Poland, in May 2003. The PSI builds on wider efforts by the international community to prevent the proliferation of WMD, including through existing treaties and regimes. The scope and aims of the PSI are set out in the statement of Interdiction Principles (Paris, 4 September 2003). Turkey, while following other PSI activities, has herself hosted a land, sea and air interdiction PSI exercise in 24-26 May 2006 with the participation of 37 guest nations. Turkey continues to actively contribute to the PSI activities.
Pursuing an active policy against terrorism, Turkey has joined, as initial partner state, the “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” (GICNT), launched by Presidents Putin and Bush of the Russian Federation and the USA, following a joint statement in St. Petersburg on 15 July 2006. Turkey has hosted the Initiative’s second meeting in Ankara on 12-13 February 2007.
Turkey has also welcomed the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 regarding the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. With a view to fulfilling the provisions of international non-proliferation instruments and arrangements to which Turkey is party, an enhanced system of export controls is implemented in Turkey. The Turkish export controls system is in line with the standards of the European Union.
The export of sensitive and dual-use materials covered by international instruments and export regimes is controlled by virtue of a two-tier mechanism that involves separate processes of:
- licensing by The Ministry of National Defence (MND) for military equipment, arms and ammunition and the Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEA) for dual
-use items described in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control list
- registration by the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade (UFT). - For military equipment, arms and ammunition, the first tier is regulated by the newly adopted Law Number 5201 dated 03.07.2004 which replaced Law Number 3763 of 1940 regarding "The Control of Private Industrial Enterprises Producing War Weapons, Vehicles, Equipment and Ammunition". This law requires licenses to be obtained from the MND for the export of all weapons and ammunition. The MND issues every year a list of all weapons, ammunition, explosive materials and their parts, which are subject to licensing. As for items listed in the NSG list, TAEA’s licensing authority is regulated by the “Regulation on Export Licensing of Materials, Equipment and Related Technologies Employed in the Nuclear Field” published in the official gazette dated 15 February 2000, No: 23965.
As to the second tier, it is the duty of the UFT to take all monitoring, control, arrangement and orientation measures regarding exports and to draft the general export policy of Turkey. In fulfilling its duties, the UFT avails itself of the 13 exporters' unions located around the country. Istanbul Metals and Minerals Exporters' Union (IMMIB), like other exporters' unions, is responsible for the implementation of the general export policy, under the auspices of the UFT. All exporters are required to be a member of an exporters' union in order to be able to export any good or material.
Sensitive goods, technologies and dual-use materials are registered by IMMIB which denotes this registration on the customs declaration. This mechanism enables a centralized monitoring of the export of sensitive goods, technologies and dual-use materials on the basis of exporting company, product, quantity and value. IMMIB determines whether or not the good to be exported is subject to export controls. If so, then this export is submitted to the procedure described above, where permissions from relevant institutions are sought.
The applications for export is evaluated in accordance with the UN embargo lists, OSCE commitments and principles as well as the EU embargo decisions which Turkey aligns herself with. The control lists of the international instruments against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or export control regimes that Turkey is a party to, are also taken into consideration. Regarding the control of dual-use items and technology (which can be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, but not included in the control lists of any non-proliferation instrument or export control regime), the “catch-all” legislation is also finalized and incorporated into the export control regime of Turkey.
According to the “catch-all” legislation; “the export of dual-use items which can be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, but not included in the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use Items and Technology Lists and Australia Group Chemical Precursors Lists is subject to the permission of the UFT General Directorate for export if the conditions stated below are present:
a) In case of a suspicion that the end-user is developing weapons of mass destruction; b) If the exporter company declares its suspicion that the whole material or any part of it will be used in developing weapons of mass destruction; c) In situations that may cause human rights violations and danger for national and international security.” The MND has also made its own “catch-all” arrangement in the framework of Law Number 5201.
1540 Committe has been established following the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 concerning “Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”. 1540 Committee, monitors the development achieved by the member states concerning non-proliferation within the context of the said UNSC Resolution. Turkey had submitted the first national report to the Committee on 1 November 2004. 1540 Committee reviewed the national reports and requested additional information from the member states. Within this context, Turkey had submitted a revised national report to the Committee in January-2006. Finally, a matrix prepared for Turkey by the Committee has been updated and submitted to 1540 Committee in December-2007.
Turkey wishes to see, both in her region and at the global level that all countries adhere to the goals of non-proliferation and work collectively for their accomplishment. Turkey believes that it is important to maintain the legal framework and the basic parameters of the international legally binding non-proliferation regimes. Strengthening and effective implementation of the international non-proliferation instruments and regimes is equally important for Turkey.
Turkey considers the The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) as the first step towards an internationally accepted legal framework in this field. Turkey became party to the mentioned Code at the launching conference held in The Hague on 25-26 November 2002.
Conventional Weapons Proliferation also constitutes a serious concern for Turkey. The excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) pose a significant threat to peace and security as well as to the social and economic development of many countries. Death toll resulting from SALW is increasingly frightening. There is also a close relationship between illicit trade in SALW and terrorism. Therefore, Turkey strongly supports international cooperation to combat and eradicate illicit trade in SALW within the framework of the UN, the OSCE and other fora. The OSCE Document on SALW constitutes an important basis for our efforts in this field. The UN Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects adopted in 2001 is also a milestone in placing the issue of SALW firmly on the international agenda. In this respect, full and comprehensive implementation of the UN Programme of Action, as well as strengthening it with new measures in accordance with evolving security needs bear significant importance in fight against risks and threats emanating from illicit trafficking and proliferation of SALW.
In this context, proliferation and unauthorised use of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) require particular attention. MANPADS pose an imminent and acute threat to civil aviation, peacekeeping, crisis management and anti-terrorist operations. In the hands of trained terrorists, these weapons have already caused substantial civilian casualties. Therefore, international community must act decisively to improve stockpile security and strengthen export controls in countries that import and manufacture MANPADS. Turkey fully supports the efforts of the international community, particularly in the UN, the OSCE and the Wassenaar Arrangement to establish stricter export controls and information exchange to combat the proliferation of MANPADS. In addition to the threats posed by the proliferation of SALW and MANPADS, Turkey is fully conscious of the human sufferings and casualties caused by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of Anti-Personnel Land Mines (APLM). The Ottawa Convention constitutes the major international instrument aimed at eliminating the said mines as well as preventing their use, production, stockpiling and transfer. Turkey became a party to the Ottawa Convention together with Greece and the Convention entered into force for Turkey on 1 March 2004. The existing legislation of Turkey is sufficient to give legal effect to all Treaty prohibitions.
At the beginning of 1996, Turkey announced its that it would ban the production and transfer of the anti-personnel land mines for three years. Then it extended the period for another three years in 1999 and for an indefinite duration in 2002. Turkey stopped the mining activities and started the clearing studies in January, 1998. Under the provisions of the Convention, Turkey has the obligations to destroy its stockpiled anti-personnel land mines by 2008, and to clear mined areas by 2014. In order to destroy the stockpiled anti-personel land mines, the “Turkish Armed Forces Munitions Disposal Facility” was built and has been operational as of November 2007.
Furthermore, Turkey became a State Party to “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons” (CCW) and its three Protocols (Protocol I, Amended Protocol II and Protocol IV) in 2005.
The OSCE, which Turkey is a participating State since its inception, has a unique place in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security architecture. Its comprehensive approach to security includes commitments and mechanisms relating to politico-military matters that seek to enhance security by promoting openness, transparency and cooperation among participating States.
Turkey regards Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) as an important tool for establishing security and stability. CSBMs were originally designed to contribute to reducing the possibility of armed conflict and of misunderstanding of military activities, which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the states lack clear and timely information. Thus, CSBMs help to build mutual confidence by creating military transparency. The Vienna Document, which was adopted in 1990, embodied the first generation of CSBMs. The CSBMs contained in the Vienna Document were reviewed three times in 1992, 1994 and 1999, in order to update them in the face of new conditions evolved in the OSCE area. The latest version of the Document (Vienna Document 1999) was adopted during the 1999 OSCE İstanbul Summit.
As an indication of the importance attached to regional security cooperation and drawing upon the experience gained from the Vienna Document, Turkey started to conclude bilateral CSBM arrangements with her neighbours in the Balkans. In this context, Turkey has CSBM arrangements with Albania and with Macedonia. Turkey has also proposed to sign similar documents with other regional countries.
Turkey attaches great importance to enhancing confidence and security in the Black Sea. The document on “Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea” constitutes a landmark in this direction. On the other hand, the Document constitutes a unique example of an endeavour to establish a regional confidence and security building regime in the naval field. Turkey firmly believes that implementation of this document will be highly instrumental in increasing confidence among the Black Sea littoral states and thus substantially contribute to peace, security and stability in the region. Turkey has been making her utmost effort to cooperate in good faith for putting into practice the provisions contained in this Document.
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in 1990 and entered into force in July 1992. The CFE Treaty ensured significant reductions in five categories of conventional arms and equipment, namely battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery systems, combat aircraft and attack helicopters and imposed certain numerical limitations on states parties. As such, Turkey considers the Treaty as the cornerstone of the European security architecture. Turkey participated, in an active and constructive manner, in the negotiations for adapting the CFE Treaty to the new conditions that emerged with the end of the bipolar structure of the Cold War era.
The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in Istanbul on 19 November 1999, during the OSCE Istanbul Summit. Once in force, it will place legally binding limits on the armed forces of every individual country that is party to it. Thus, it will contribute to enhancing peace, security and stability throughout Europe. The maintenance of the Flank Regime and its reconciliation with the structure of the new Treaty was the most vital and determining aspect of the adaptation process. The substance of this important element of the Treaty is maintained under the adapted CFE.
Turkey attaches importance to the early entry into force of the The Adapted Treaty. The Adapted Treaty will enter into force when all 30 states-parties have ratified it. Thereafter, other countries remaining outside the CFE regime will be able to accede to it. However, Turkey supports the position of the NATO Alliance that the ratification process on the adapted CFE can not start unless Russia fulfils entirely the Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova. On 14th July 2007, the Russian Federation declared that it would suspend its obligations under the CFE Treaty and its associated documents, 150 days after this notification, claiming the problems related to the implementation of the CFE Treaty by the NATO countries after the enlargement of NATO and non-ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty by the NATO members. As of 12 December RF has put its decision on suspension into effect. Efforts, towards the solution of the problem are being maintained
Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty by the NATO members.
The Treaty on Open Skies was concluded in 1992 as a major confidence-building instrument and an important mechanism for facilitating the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements. The Treaty establishes a regime that permits States Parties to conduct observation flights over the territories of other States Parties without any restrictions. Turkey ratified the Treaty in 1994 and welcomed the entry into force of the said Treaty on 1 January 2002. Observation flights under the Treaty started on 1 August 2002.
Turkey has its own Open Skies Aircraft, CN-235 Casa, which was certified on 6 May 2004, to conduct observation flights over territories of other States Parties.
Turkey supports the idea to make use of Open Skies regime for environmental and ecological purposes.
Turkey, a country who has initiated bilateral regimes of confidence and security building measures in the Balkans since 1991, also attaches importance to the confidence and security building arrangements in South East Europe. In this context, Turkey supports the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC), which was established within the framework of the Stability Pact for South East Europe and activated in October 2000. Turkey, considering RACVIAC as a highly useful regional tool for transparency and cooperation, provides personnel for the permanent staff in RACVIAC since the beginning of the project. The role of RACVIAC is to provide a forum to promote regular dialogue and cooperation amongst the regional states in all arms control and confidence and security building matters. RACVIAC also aims to facilitate full participation by nations in the implementation of the arms control agreements they have concluded, and to help improve implementation standards by providing a multinational forum for training personnel in these activities. The bilateral agreement establishing the principle regulations of RACVIAC was signed between Germany and Croatia on 8 March 2001. Turkey is invited to join the said agreement in February 2003 by Croatia, the depositor of the Agreement. The domestic legal procedure regarding Turkey’s accession to the said agreement has been finalized and Turkey has become a party to the Agreement in September 2004.
Turkey is an active member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) since 1996. CD is a unique multilateral negotiation forum in the field of international disarmament issues. However, at present due to differences of view on its programme of work, the conference has not been able to deal with substantial issues for seven years. There are four main issues among the topics subject for discussion. These are Nuclear Disarmament, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, Negative Security Assurances and Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space. Turkey makes her contribution to the efforts to overcome the current stalemate and develop an agreed programme of work in the CD.
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) is a multi-national forum for enhancing cooperation towards promoting peace, security and stability in Asia. The idea of convening the CICA was first proposed by H.E. Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, on October 5th, 1992, at the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.The Member States of CICA are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Mongolia, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Palestine, Republic of Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Uzbekistan; while the Observer-States are Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Ukraine, USA, and Vietnam. Furthermore, United Nations, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and League of Arab States participate the meetings of CICA. From the outset, Turkey, attached utmost importance to the CICA process; bearing the importance of international disarmament and arms control in mind, and believing that regional cooperation and expansion of the concepts such as prevention of disputes, confidence and security building beyond the OSCE region will further improve relations among Central Asian countries.