Press Releases, Statements, Notes/Articles and Letters INITIATIVE BY TURKEY ON CYPRUS, 24 JANUARY 2006 Cyprus a reminder CYPRUS: WHAT HAS HAPPENED? Highlights of the UNSG´s report Cyprus (Historical Overview) What the World Said Before the Referanda What the World said After the Referanda The Annan Plan and the Greek Cypriot “NO”: False Reasons and Claims Greek Cypriot state terror revealed Confidence Building Measures (1992-1994) Meaningful Anniversary Of The Cyprus Peace Operation Turkish Parliament Proclaims Solidarity With TRNC And Demands Equal Treatment For The Two States On The Island Resolution By The Turkish Grand National Assembly On 21 January 1997 Circular Note Sent To The Embassies Of The EU Member States Concerning The Greek Cypriot Application To The EU, 30 June 1997 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the establishment of an Association Council Resolution Adopted By The Legislative Assembly of The TRNC March 9, 1998 Aide-Memoire By The TRNC To The British High Commission In Nicosia, 26 March 1998 Documents Given By President Denktas To The UN Secretary-General During Their Meeting In Geneva- 28 March 1998 Resolution of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 15 July 1999 Treaty Provisions And Basic Documents With Regard To The EU Membership Of Cyprus British Professor of International Law Prof. H. Mendelson Q.C.'s opinion on the legal aspects of the one-sided membership application of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus to the European Union Final communique of the annual coordination meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference ( United Nations, New York 28 September 2004, 14 Shaa'ban 1425 H - para. related to Cyprus) Report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 28 May 2004 Report of the Secretary-General Annan on the United Nations operation in in Cyprus, 3 December 2007 The Status of the Two Peoples in Cyprus Edited By Necati Münir Ertekün Greek Cypriot Attempts To Purchase Missiles From Russia And The Resulting Danger For The Peace And Stability In Cyprus EU and Cyprus:An Expert View Opinion of Professor M.H. Mendelson Q.C on the Application of “the Republic of Cyprus” to Join the European Union Grand Deception, Korkmaz HAKTANIR, Founding Member of the Cyprus Foundation '' BARBARIE A CHYPRE '' Le Soir Illustré 1967 The Need for New Perspective on Cyprus
Korkmaz HAKTANIR Founding Member of the CYPRUS FOUNDATION The Grand Deception

Once again it was August. Was there a subtle change in the weather? Perhaps it was only wishful thinking, perhaps the summer heat was imperceptibly receding. The western wind kept gently blowing over the memorial, sweeping the dry countryside before reaching the eastern coastline of the island. In the silence of early morning I looked over the names, as I had done so many times. Names of children, mothers and grandparents, all long gone, with the age marked beside each name.

If Yüksel Arif had lived he would have been 36 today. He was only ten on 14 August 1974. He would probably have married sometime in the 80s and have had children of his own. But he was never given a chance to grow to be a teenager, to enjoy a free and unsuspecting life and to experience the warmth of love. One can imagine the sort of childhood he must have had during those ten dark years of persecusion from 1964 to 1974, before he and his family, along with many other Turkish Cypriot families, were exterminated one August day in the villages of Muratağa, Atlılar and Sandallar by their Greek neighbours.

Knowing that this was no accident makes it all the more painful and cruel. There is a haunting photograph of the school children of Atlılar, taken one week before the massacre. Three rows of small girls and boys stare from that paling picture, with grown-up looks. None seems to be smiling. Who can tell now which one is Yüksel? Since 26 years, he lies there, still a child of ten, his name marked on marble beside those of his mother, sisters and brothers. Fahriye, his baby sister, is merely four months old. They all lie there. And the grand deception goes on.
I was first there when they had been gone just for three years. Another 23 years have gone by, but time has not helped to blunt the shocking dimensions of this atrocity or other massacres committed in cold blood over the island throughout the years. As in each August, I watch again. I watch to sense a change, a change perhaps as subtle as the change in the August weather, a sign of silent recognition of the enormity of what was perpetrated here by Greek neighbours of Turkish Cypriot families.

As in past Augusts, that change is not there, even so many years later. Their faces have grown older, but they are mostly the same people who have planned such extermination. They are hardly saying anything new and they all make less sense as time goes by. Like strange furnitures from a Batman movie, these people running the Greek Cypriot entity in the south of the island seem to be fossilized in a time-warp, without any feeling, without any remorse for the lives they have stolen and the families they have shattered.

This heartless approach to Turkish Cypriot lives, as well as Turkish Cypriot rights, is not only a cause for condemnation, but also a cause for genuine alarm for the future. The Greeks of the island have never come to admit to themselves and to the world the enormity of what they have done as of December 1963. If anything, one fears they may be getting worse. As Yüksel Arif lies there, the Greek Cypriot defense minister was telling his public this August that they are quietly pursuing their rearmament campaign. Just as they had set up secret armies four decades ago in pursuit of outlawed aims. They keep lecturing the world that what they have done was an internal matter subject to the doctrine of necessity! It was a necessity for Greek neighbours of Turkish Cypriot families to deny Yüksel Arif his life. The world could sit back and relax as they walked over his grave. Afterall, it was only an internal matter.

One feels it might be naïve to expect anything else. Afterall, they are all either the architects or students of that grand deception, the Akritas Plan. The president of that entity in the south of the island is still Hiperides, one of those directly responsible for the preparation and execution of this infamous plan that lies at the heart of the Cyprus dispute.

If you want to understand the Akritas Plan, read it one August day, as if you were explaining to Yüksel Arif why he was denied his life, why all those children and mothers were denied their lives. Read it slowly, so that even a child can understand, as I will relate to you the story of that grand deception.

In the 1950s there was a terrorist organization in Cyprus called EOKA whose chieftain was George Grivas. He was a Greek Cypriot by birth. But he made his military career in Greece and gained notoriety as the leader of an extreme right-wing organization, which employed torture and assassination during the Greek civil war in the 1940s. He brought the same methods to Cyprus in 1955 to launch a campaign of terror. Its purpose was not independence, but simply leading the island's annexation to Greece. Greek Cypriots became willing executioners of EOKA whose targets were the British rulers of the island and its former rulers, the Turks of Cyprus.

This Greek policy was called enosis, an extension of the racist megali idea, the codename for Greek expansionism. Such an indefensible policy needed a guise to give it some respectability. It was the age of decolonization and self-determination presented a suitable cover. There was, however, no nation in Cyprus, but two peoples with completely different identities. Therefore, such a racist policy of annexation could only be applied if one of the two peoples of the island could be disregarded or discarded. The Turkish Cypriots naturally wanted neither. They did not want to disregard or discard the Greek Cypriots either. They simply wanted to part their ways rather than be subjugated or dominated. It was accepted by Britain and later the United Nations that not only one, but both peoples of the island had an equal right to determine their future. But the Greeks wanted to have the whole cake.

There were also of course the two motherlands from where the two peoples of the island inherited their Turkish and Greek identities. When the Greek policy of annexation under the mantle of unilateral self-determination did not fly, either through terrorism in the island or manipulation of the United Nations, Cyprus became an independent partnership state in 1960, with Turkish and Greek wings, on the basis of international agreements reached between Turkey and Greece, and accepted by Britain and the leaders of the two peoples of the island.

Our dark character, the notorious George Grivas, was under those circumstances withdrawn from the island to Greece, but he remained vocally opposed to a settlement, which prohibited enosis. He was to return to the island, as we shall see, following the forceful destruction of the joint Turkish-Greek republic in December 1963 by the Greek Cypriots, to command and train the unlawful Greek Cypriot military forces established by Archbishop Makarios and to tell them that "The Greek forces from Greece have come to Cyprus in order to impose the will of the Greeks of Cyprus on the Turks. We want enosis, but the Turks are against it. We shall impose our will on the Turks. We are strong and we shall do so." Grivas was probably speaking with the memory of Crete on his mind where the most complete ethnic cleansing anywhere in the world was achieved by the Greeks against the Turks of the island. The sad story of the Turks of Crete deserves to be told and carefully studied for the bitter lessons it holds for Cyprus.

But on that note of racist arrogance and flagrant espousal of oppression, let us now leave Grivas aside and turn to the deeds of a darker character, Archbishop Makarios, and to others who conspired with him to create the Cyprus question. It was no secret that the Greek Cypriot leadership under Archbishop Makarios saw the 1960 independence and the creation of a partnership republic of the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus with a guarantee system not as the final solution, but merely as a stepping stone on the way to fulfilling the obsession of annexation to Greece where the enosis cause had its strong supporters. Right after independence, a group which called itself merely the organization started publishing underground newspapers in Athens which were distributed among the terrorist EOKA members in Cyprus. The basic message of these journals was that the Greek national cause in Cyprus had not come to an end with the establishment of the republic. On the contrary, the struggle was just beginning and would continue until enosis was achieved.

Following independence, EOKA created a sister organization in civilian clothes, called EDMA. Former Greek Cypriot gunmen started assuming key positions in the new administration of the island and EDMA supported young EOKA members for military training abroad. From 1960 to 1963 when the joint Turkish-Greek republic of Cyprus maintained its precarious existence, Archbishop Makarios could never be seen in the role of the president of that republic. He continued to play the role of the ethnic and religious leader of the Greek Cypriot side, giving endless enosis speeches and sermons each week and paying homage to the "heroes" of the terrorist EOKA.

Lieutenant General George Karayannis, the Greek army officer who served in Cyprus at the time, were to reveal to an Athens newspaper on 13 June 1965 that Archbishop Makarios decided in August 1960, simultaneously with the establishment of the partnership republic, to proceed with the following:
· to organize the Greek Cypriots for battle and to arm them,
· to proceed with the revision of the Constitution.

According to Karayannis,
"First of all, he put into operation a specially prepared scheme for organizing the Greek Cypriots for battle. When progress with this organization reached such a point that the opposition of the Turkish Cypriots deemed manageable, he would proceed next to the revision of the Constitution.

"The organization of the Greek Cypriots for battle which was thus created and which initially bore the title 'the organization,' finally took the name of 'The National Guard of Cyprus.' The Minister of the Interior Polycarpos Yeorgadjis was appointed as its commander, and the President of the Parliament Glafkos Clerides and the Minister of Labour Tasos Papadopoulos as its deputy commanders."
As one can see, an organization and a plan was there from the beginning, among the Greeks of Cyprus and Athens, with fatal designs against the 1960 independence of the island and the Turks of Cyprus who represented an obstacle on the way to enosis, which had been prohibited under international agreements. What Karayiannis tells us means that as early as August 1960, the month when the transfer of powers from Britain to the Turkish-Greek republic took place, and before the new constitution had been given a chance to work, Archbishop Makarios had already decided to impose by force of arms on the Turkish Cypriot partner of the republic, a revision of the constitution. Therefore, the plan only waited to be put on paper and the organization to take up arms when the time came. The Turkish Cypriot leadership watched this situation and predicted that for the Greek Cypriots that time would come before the 1965 presidential elections, perhaps in the beginning of 1964. As things turned out, they were wrong only by ten days. The Bloody Christmas of 1963 was for them and for Cyprus the beginning of a traumatic decade.

Against this background, an analysis of the Akritas Plan is essential for understanding not only the extreme gravity of Greek Cypriot designs and actions that led to the destruction of the joint republic in December 1963, but also for grasping the true meaning of what the Greek Cypriots are telling the world even today. It runs so crudely counter to all norms of human decency and conduct that the plan is often buried under an Italian Mafia style omerta, the code of silence about the crime. The Turkish Cypriots have been the targets of this extermination plan, so through bitter experience those who have survived know well what it was. Thanks to Greek Cypriot disclosures and admissions, some prompted by endless Greek Cypriot in-fighting, others by the urge to add their names to an ill-conceived racist cause, the Akritas Plan is well established as the central piece of the Greek Cypriot conspiracy which brought so much curse to the island and untold misery on the Turkish Cypriots- the people whose extermination was planned and attempted.
We have two main sources for the Akritas Plan, one of them a Greek Cypriot newspaper called Patris which first made it public, and the other Glafcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot president himself, who has supplied some important missing parts in the first disclosure, from his own copy one strongly suspects. The Patris and Clerides versions of the plan are one and the same and, apart from the Patris omissions, differ only in style of translation. It should be noted that the authenticity of the Akritas Plan has never been in question and it has never been denied or denounced by any Greek Cypriot or any Greek Cypriot authority. On the contrary, Glafcos Clerides, certainly one of the authors of the plan and a member of the triumvirate entrusted with its execution, while evading his own role, has totally validated the plan and its reasoning in his memoirs and is on record to have confirmed the Akritas Plan and the Patris disclosures to various foreign journalists and authors who have interviewed him in the 1970s and 80s.

More than thirty years ago, on 21 April 1966, the Greek Cypriot newspaper Patris, which served as the mouthpiece of George Grivas, published a Top Secret document signed The Chief Akritas. It was a detailed plan of conspiracy drawn up on the instructions of Archbishop Makarios in collusion with Greek army officers. The plan aimed at abrogating the international agreements on which the independence of the partnership republic was based, to amend the constitution in a manner, which would turn the joint state into a Greek entity, and to achieve enosis- annexation of the island to Greece. It explained in Byzantine terms what clandestine preparations and international deceptions would be needed to achieve such an unlawful objective.

For this, as one Greek historian put it, the Greek Cypriot leadership had to knock the Turks out. The Akritas Plan provided, among other things, for the creation of an underground army which would suppress any resistance by the Turkish Cypriots, most forcefully, and in the shortest possible time, and make the Greek Cypriots masters of the situation within a day or two, before outside intervention would be possible, probable, or justifiable. It went on to state that, "The forceful and decisive suppression of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to show any reaction, because they will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences for their community."

Harry Scott Gibbons was in 1963 covering the Middle East for the London Daily Express from Cyprus. In his book The Genocide Files, based on his own first-hand experience and eyewitness accounts of the events in Cyprus from 1963 to 1968, he notes that "when Makarios became president, one of the first appointees to his cabinet was Yeorgadjis who, with Grivas now out of the picture, took control of EOKA and the enosis movement. It was not long, however, before Makarios announced that he had signed the terms of the independence agreements under coercion. Enosis was still the final solution, he said. The call for union with Greece again swept the island.

"And Yeorgadjis was given the task of organizing that end, the 'final solution' that, in order to be achieved, would of necessity mean the extermination of the Turks. And so,… Makarios, the saintly president, Yeorgadjis, the EOKA killer, and Glafkos Clerides, wartime Royal Air Force hero turned EOKA propaganda chief, at that time leader of the Cyprus House of Representatives and today president of Greek Cyprus, sat down and worked out a plan for genocide."

In the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
· Killing members of the group,
· Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,
· Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,
· Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,
· Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Under the same Convention,
· Genocide,
· Conspiracy to commit genocide,
· Direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
· Attempt to commit genocide,
· Complicity in genocide
are punishable acts.

There are two elements in the definition of the crime of genocide. The first is the commission of certain acts and the second is the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular identifiable group. Both of these criteria apply to the Greek Cypriots, with what they intended to do in the Akritas Plan and what they actually did as of December 1963 against the Turkish Cypriots. All those Greek Cypriots who have conspired, incited and attempted to, or have been accomplices in, genocide have gone unpunished. While many of these killers were easily identifiable, not a single one of them have ever been punished for their crimes.
In the course of the preparation of the Akritas Plan, Greek Cypriot officers serving in the Greek Army were commissioned to assist in specifying the military measures to be taken against the Turkish Cypriots by a secret Greek Cypriot armed force and by the Greek military contingent stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance. One of these officers was Dimitrios Ioannides, who served as a major in Cyprus in 1963 and 1964 in what became the unconstitutional Greek Cypriot National Guard. Later he was to become the head of the military junta in Athens, which ruled Greece until 1974. Ioannides was to mastermind the 15 July 1974 coup in Cyprus and install a professional killer, Nicos Sampson, as president.
The product of this conspiracy was the Akritas Plan. It was only on the publication of this astounding and incriminating document that the events of December 1963 and its aftermath fell into perspective. According to the Patris disclosures, "Makarios entrusted Yeorgadjis, who took the codename of Akritas, with the task of establishing the organization. The minister of labour, Tasos Papadopoulos, was appointed deputy chief of the organization, and Glafkos Clerides became the Chief of Operations. Makarios himself undertook the work of overall supervision."
The plan started by making clear who was running the show. "Recent public statements by Archbishop Makarios have shown the course which our national problem will take in the near future," it said. Patris, in publishing the plan, said it appeared to have been written and distributed with the approval of Makarios several months prior to December 1963. The escalation in Greek Cypriot rhetoric, policies and actions against the joint Turkish-Greek republic, however, testifies that the finalization of the Akritas Plan stretches back to 1962. In fact, Andreas Azinas, a close collaborator of Makarios, places this date as 2 May 1962 and underlines that Greece itself was also a direct party to the plan. (Greek Cypriot daily Simerini of 17 July 2000)
It is now a matter of historical record that in 1962 Archbishop Makarios ordered the finalization of a plan based on the principles of,
· "annihilating a sizeable part of the Turkish Cypriot community in 48 hours,"
· "uniting the island with Greece before Turkey could intervene,"
· "misleading world public opinion into believing that what was occurring on the island was a simple civil strife, perpetrated by some Turkish Cypriot extremists."
Towards the end of 1962 and in early 1963, two paramilitary organizations came into being, one directly under the command of Yeorgadjis and the other under the command of Papadopoulos. Clerides worked very closely with Yeorgadjis and Papadopoulos in forming and arming these groups, a fact reported in the secret British documents of the time.

In 1963, however, these groups started to question directives from Makarios, prompting the Archbishop to organize and arm two more paramilitary organizations - one under the command of convicted killer Nicos Sampson and the other led by Vassos Lyssarides, Makarios' personal doctor, in order to assert his control over the Greek Cypriot armed elements.

Angelos Vlachos, a Greek diplomat who served in Cyprus during the period of EOKA terror and later in Athens with responsibility for Cyprus affairs, notes in his book Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem that "there exist well-founded proofs leading to the conclusion that, from 1962 onwards, the Archbishop had begun to toy with the idea of a new act of power, that is to say a new offensive. In January 1963…planning exercises were carried out for three days at the Presidential Palace in Nicosia, with the objective of neutralizing the Turks. The Archbishop's staff officers envisaged the participation also of the Greek Force in Cyprus in the operations…In order to begin his new offensive, the Archbishop waited for Mr. Karamanlis, who had signed the Zurich/London agreements to be removed from power…When in June 1963 Mr. Karamanlis left office…the Archbishop thought the occasion opportune for making a first testing of the ground…A few months before, the Archbishop had begun to express his conviction that the Zurich Constitution was unworkable. But even the best constitutions are unworkable if those who are called upon to ensure their operation do not want to make them work. And the Archbishop did not wish to put into operation the relevant constitutional provisions which envisaged the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities, a separation which Makarios himself had insisted on."
The well-founded proofs, to which Vlachos refers, were indeed plenty. "As early as 1962, Polycarpos Yeorgadjis, the Minister of Interior, had warned the officers of his underground army that in the following year, President Makarios would propose amendments to the constitution which would be so unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots that (they) would start fighting. " (Richard A. Patrick, a Canadian geographer at the University of Waterloo, Ontario, who specialized on Cyprus in the period 1963 to 1971.)
From January 1962 until December 1963 Makarios made a number of statements, which did not leave his intentions in doubt. In a public statement in Nicosia on 5 January 1962, he stated that "the noble struggles of the people never come to an end. These struggles, although they undergo transformation, are never terminated. The struggle of the people of Cyprus too (i.e. the Greek Cypriots) will go on. The Zurich and London Agreements form a landmark in the course of this struggle, but at the same time, are a starting point and bastion for further struggles, with the object of capitalizing on what has been achieved for further conquests."
In a sermon on 15 August 1962, Makarios said, "Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun by the EOKA heroes…The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we achieve our goal…"
Speaking at his home village of Panayia on 4 September 1962, he delivered a vehement verdict against the Turkish Cypriots. He stated that "Until this small Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated."
Throughout 1963, the enosis theme was spelt ever more clearly in his statements:
"The aim of the Cyprus struggle was not the establishment of a Republic. These agreements only laid the foundation."(Public statement on 13 March 1963.)
"No Greek who ever knows me can ever believe that I would wish to work for the creation of a Cypriot national awareness. The Agreements have created a State, but not a Nation." (Statement to Cyprus Mail on 28 March 1963.)
"The union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a republic." (Statement to The Times on 9 April 1963.)
"It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus to Greece." (In an interview in Uusi Suomi of Stocholm on 5 September 1963.)
"What is our desire? We have proclaimed it many times: our union with the Motherland, eternal Greece. What will our reply be if such a solution is made difficult, and if some think compromises are required or that something be given in return? 'No' is the reply, and the struggle will continue until complete fulfillment." (In a sermon at Paralimni on 3 November 1963.)
And so on.
The plan stressed that it could only be implemented progressively, in various stages, because of the numerous and different factors which would affect the final conclusion. It made clear that every measure now contemplated was a first step and only constituted a stage towards "the final and unalterable national objective which is the full and unconditional application of self-determination."Self-determination, which the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus possessed separately in the absence of a single nation in the island as recognized by the colonial power, was in the Akritas Plan the code word for enosis. In describing "the method to be used outside," it stated that "The Turks have so far been able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on ENOSIS but on self-determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance we must first get rid of the Agreements (e.g. the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, etc.) and of those provisions of the Constitution which inhibit the free and unbridled expression of the will of the people and which carry dangers of external intervention. For this reason our first target has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which is the First Agreement to be cited as not being recognized by the Greek Cypriots. When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite."
The External Front
Externally the plan was primarily concerned with creating impressions, rather deceptions and manipulations, to prepare the ground for misguiding the world. While "the problem was solved, in the eyes of many international circles, by the London and Zurich Agreements, which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations and agreements between the contending parties," the authors of the plan declared that the first aim of the Greek Cypriot side "has been to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not been solved and that it has to be reviewed." Consequently, "the creation of the following impressions" was accepted in the Akritas Plan as the primary objectives:
· "that the solution which has been found is not satisfactory and just,
· "that the agreement which has been reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties,
· "that the demand for the revision of the agreement is not because of any desire on the part of the Greeks to dishonor their signature, but an imperative necessity of survival for them,
· "that the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
· "that the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitute the strong element on which foreigners must rely."
With regard to the "co-existence of the two communities," it should be noted that the Turkish Cypriot leadership believed and stressed that if the rights and principles in the founding agreements were respected and the constitution observed and implemented, it would be possible for the two communities to live together. Acceptance by them of the Zurich Agreement, with the guarantee system, showed their willingness to co-exist with the Greek Cypriots. But the Greek Cypriot leadership was bent on flouting the basic articles of the constitution and the founding agreements. Every request by the Turkish Cypriots for respect for the founding agreements and the implementation of the constitution was exploited by the Greek Cypriot side to raise tensions and to accuse the Turkish Cypriot leadership of creating difficulties that prevented the smooth functioning of the state! Their propaganda line was that "there was no problem at all between the two communities; the situation would calm down if a few Turkish Cypriot leaders acting as the agents of Turkey stepped aside."
The contention that "the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitute the strong element on which foreigners must rely" reflected the Greek Cypriot policy of domination. Between 1960-1962, every means was used by the Greek Cypriots to present the Turkish Cypriot side to the outside world not as one of the two co-founding parties, but as an insignificant minority which should be disregarded. Foreign diplomats serving in Cyprus, especially those in contact with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, were subjected to heavy pressures. Some had to leave the island in a hurry after being accused of close contacts with the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot leadership resorted to every possible tactic available to it to prove that it was the sole master of the country.
The authors of the Akritas Plan were of the opinion that already satisfactory results had been achieved to attain these objectives and believed that it had been "an important trump card in our hands that the solution brought by the Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people; acting wisely in this respect our leadership avoided holding a referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959"(!)
This paragraph confirms that Makarios deliberately refrained from presenting the 1960 Agreements to referendum, and it shows that these were not, as he claimed later, agreements that had been "imposed on the people against their wishes." This is a very important point, because it exposes a serious crime committed by those who started shedding blood in 1963 on the pretext that the Constitution was unworkable. The Greek Cypriot leadership was convinced that it had already been able to persuade foreign diplomats in Cyprus that "the agreements were not satisfactory and just, and that these had been signed under coercion." While the Turkish Cypriots were striving to secure their rights under the 1960 Constitution, Makarios was busy preparing the ground for the amendment of the constitution in favor of the Greek Cypriots and aligning others to his point of view. When he visited Turkey in 1962, he had even attempted to persuade President Gürsel and Prime Minister Inönü in this direction. Prime Minister Inönü had told him that any attempt to unilaterally amend the constitution would lead to very serious consequences.
But this did not put an end to his campaign against the constitution. Showing that "so far the administration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks had played only a negative part acting as a brake" was also part of this campaign. This presented a dilemma for the Turkish Cypriot leadership. When the Greek Cypriot side attempted to force an unconstitutional decision, it was their right block such a decision and to request its reconsideration. When the Turkish Cypriots exercised this right, they would be accused by the Greeks of "playing a negative part acting as a brake." If they did not exercise their right, they would be serving unconstitutional Greek Cypriot interests. Despite this situation, between 1960 - 1962, the Turkish Cypriot leadership restrained itself to stay away from creating deadlock so long as it was not faced by an issue of vital interest and tried to cooperate by preserving its rights under the constitution. But this would give the Greek Cypriot side no satisfaction. It was part of their general plan to present the Turkish Cypriots as the party that played a negative, hindering role. (Speech by Rauf Denktaş in Limassol on 11 February 1972 on The Cyprus Question in the Light of the Akritas Plan)
The Greek Cypriot objectives in the second stage on an international level would be to create the impression:
· "that the aim of the Greeks in not to oppress the Turks but only to remove the unreasonable and unjust provisions of the administrative mechanism (i.e. the entire Turkish Cypriot rights as a co-founder party),
· "that it is necessary to remove these provisions right away because tomorrow may be too late,
· (Omitted in the Patris disclosures)
(Thanks to Mr. Glafkos Clerides, who, as one of the authors of the plan and as a member of the triumvirate running the secret organization, has supplied this and other missing parts of the Akritas Plan in his 1989 book, Cyprus: My Deposition, most probably from his own copy of the plan. This part, which Patris must have considered as too damaging in 1966, reads as follows according to Mr. Clerides:
"The removal of these provisions, despite the fact that this is reasonable and necessary, because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks is not possible by agreement and therefore unilateral action is justified."(!)
· "that this question of revision is a domestic issue for Cypriots and does not give the right of intervention to anyone by force or otherwise, and
· "that the proposed amendments are reasonable and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority"(!)
Under the external aspect, the Akritas Plan finally spelt out the following action to be taken:
· "The amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and the consequent de facto nullification of the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance…,
· "Once this is achieved the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.
· "Once those provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which restrict the exercise of the right to self-determination are removed, the people of Cyprus (i.e. the Greek Cypriots) will be able, freely, to express and apply its will.
· "It will be possible for the Force of the State (the Police Force) and in addition, friendly military Forces, to resist legitimately any intervention internally or from outside, because then we will then be completely independent (i.e. to declare enosis!) - The Clerides version reads as "Legal confrontation by the forces of the State of every internal or external intervention" omitting any reference to the "friendly military forces."
The external tactics of the plan closed by underlining that if the Greek Cypriot side hoped "to have any chance of success internationally in our above actions, we cannot and must not reveal or declare the various stages of the struggle before the previous one is completed."
The Internal Front
The second part of the Akritas Plan dealt with the "internal aspect."
It seemed to have two main preoccupations: how to prevent external intervention and how to suppress immediately and forcefully any Turkish Cypriot resistance to unlawful Greek Cypriot actions.
The internal aspect of the Akritas Plan begins by stating that "The only danger that can be described as insurmountable is the possibility of a forceful external intervention. After discussing "this danger", it reaches the conclusion that "If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make under stage (a) above (the amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and the consequent de facto nullification of the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance), we will see, on the one hand that intervention will not be justified and, on the other hand, we will have every support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before negotiations can take place between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage, i.e. at the stage of contacts (before intervention) that we shall need international support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments proposed by us seem reasonable and justified…The first step, therefore, would be to get rid of intervention by proposing amendments in the first stage.
The tactic to be followed is omitted in the Patris disclosures. Glafkos Clerides has provided the text of this omission as follows:
"Tactics: We shall attempt to justify unilateral action for constitutional amendments once the efforts for a common agreement are excluded."
As in the first omission, Patris has concealed by this omission as well that the Greek Cypriot intention was to resort to "unilateral action for constitutional amendment," something which could only be achieved illegally through the use of force against the Turkish Cypriots.
Then the authors of the plan go on to deal with the central question of the suppression of the Turkish Cypriots, whom they expect to react strongly. Patris, here again, has omitted in its disclosure the reference in the Akritas Plan to the "unilateral amendment" of the constitution, which would trigger such reaction. The Clerides version reads as "…the possibility remains that the Turkish Cypriots, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment of any article of the constitution, will react instinctively…" The Greek Cypriot thinking reflected here is extremely Byzantine - they imagine that when they proceed to amend the constitution unilaterally, that is illegally, there is the possibility that the Turkish Cypriots may stage "killings, atrocities or bomb attacks" against their own community to "create the impression" that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that intervention is imperative for their protection! What actually happened is that when the Greek Cypriots started executing the Akritas Plan and attacked the Turkish Cypriots in December 1963 without any provocation, they tried to create the impression that the Turkish Cypriots had "rebelled"! Their lies were totally exposed by the world media at the time. The attackers were the Greeks and the defenders were the Turks. There was no "Turkish rebellion" and this was used as a monstrous pretext for the massacre of the Turks.
The plan stipulated that "Should clashes occur, they will be dealt with in the initial stages legally by the legally established security forces, in accordance with a plan. All actions will be clothed in legal form." (The Clerides version) The so-called "security forces" of Archbishop Makarios were Greek policemen and gendarmerie, heavily reinforced by various factions of the terrorist EOKA, organized into paramilitary underground forces under the command of Yeorgadjis, Papadopoulos, Sampson and Lyssarides. These instructions showed that, clothed in legality, force would be used against the Turkish Cypriots on an increasing scale under a plan. This is actually what happened as of December 1963 until 1974.
The entire third paragraph of the "internal aspect" is omitted in the Patris disclosures. It turns out that this is an extensive omission, provided as follows in the Clerides version of the Akritas Plan:
"3. Before the right of unilateral amendments of the constitution is established, decisions and actions which require positive violent acts, such as, for example, the use of force to unify separate municipalities, must be avoided. Such a decision compels the Government to intervene by force to bring about unification of municipal properties, which will probably compel the Turks to react violently. On the contrary, it is easier for us, using legal methods, to amend, for instance, the provision of the 70 to 30 ratio in the public service, when it is the Turks who will have to take violent action, while for us this procedure will not amount to action, but to refusal to act (to implement).
"The same applies to the issue of the separate majorities with regard to taxation legislation.
"These measures have already been considered and a series of similar measures have been chosen for implementation. Once our right of unilateral amendments to the constitution is established de facto by such actions, then we shall be able to advance using our judgement and our strength more decidedly."
This paragraph of the Akritas Plan is striking for its audacity. Here again the basic preoccupation is how to illegally amend the constitution through unilateral action. The use of force to achieve these illegal and illegitimate objectives is clearly sanctioned by the reference to the "positive violent acts." But an easier procedure is suggested to achieve the illegal objectives some of which are identified in the plan - refusal to act to implement the basic provisions of the constitution - until such time as the Greek Cypriot "right" of unilateral amendments is established de facto when it can use its strength more decidedly!
The fourth paragraph of the plan under the "internal aspect" develops a number of arguments in favor of "effective use of force in dealing with the Turks." It states that it would be naïve to believe that it would be possible for the Greek Cypriots to proceed to substantive acts of amendment of the constitution (i.e. doing away with the entire Turkish Cypriot rights as an equal party), as a first step towards the more general plan (i.e. clearing the way to enosis), without expecting Turkish Cypriot resistance. "For this reason," it goes on, "the existence and strengthening of our Organization is imperative because,
a. if, in case of spontaneous resistance by the Turks, our counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a panic created among Greeks, in towns in particular. We will then be in danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, then they will probably be brought to their senses and restrict their activities to insignificant, isolated incidents.
b. In case of a planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this be staged or not, it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to become the masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible, probable or justifiable.
c. The forceful and decisive suppression of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences for their Community.
The Clerides version of this important sub-paragraph reads as follows:
"In either of the above cases, effective use of force in dealing with the Turks will facilitate to a great extent our subsequent actions for further amendments. It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction, because they will know that their reaction will be weak or seriously harmful for their community."
a. In case of clashes becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through actions (a) to (d) including the immediate declaration of ENOSIS, because, then there will be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic activity.
There are strong indications to presume that the failure by Makarios to implement this last clause prompted the pro-Grivas Patris to disclose the Akritas Plan.
In summary, the Akritas Plan was a conspiracy to destroy progressively the 1960 settlement and to overturn the joint republic. It was to be carried out in stages, the first being to convince the world that the 1960 Constitution was unworkable, the second to amend the constitution, whether the Turkish Cypriots liked it or not, ostensibly to make it more workable, but in reality to remove the restraints which it imposed on unfettered Greek Cypriot control of the joint government. Later stages were to be the abrogation of the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance on which the settlement rested, the suppression of the Turkish Cypriots by force and finally the declaration of enosis under the guise of self-determination to be exercised unilaterally by Greek Cypriots in total disregard for the rights and wishes of Turkish Cypriots who would have been dealt with through the effective use of force.
The "Organization" was ready to start implementing the Akritas Plan by the summer of 1963. It had long been circulated to the "sub-headquarters" of the secret organization. Patris disclosures, which continued in 1966 and in early 1967, revealed to some extent the military set up created under the Akritas Plan. The Turkish quarter of Nicosia, divided into six sectors, had been identified as the primary target of the "Organization" which itself had its headquarters in the Greek sector of the town. Greek Cypriot military units had been assigned to each sector with selected Turkish targets. Special units had been charged with planting bombs and eliminating Turkish Cypriot families in their areas. The leadership of the "Organization" was the same triumvirate responsible for preparing and executing the Akritas Plan: Yeorgadjis, Papadopoulos and Clerides.
Secrecy was paramount. Members of the "Organization" were to be enlightened about the plan and its objectives only verbally. No written explanation of any sort was allowed. Loss or leakage of any document pertaining to the Akritas Plan would be equivalent to high treason. In view of the outrageous objectives of the plan and the manipulations it hoped to achieve internationally, it was recognized in the plan itself that "there can be no action that would inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents of the present document…" It also stressed that "every effort must be made to show ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our plans in writing or any reference in the press or in any document is strictly prohibited. Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise." The Akritas Plan ended by giving firm instructions that "The present document should be destroyed by burning under the personal responsibility of the Chief of the sub-headquarters and in the presence of all members of the staff within 10 days of its being received. " No copies were permitted. Staff members of sub-headquarters could have it in their possession only under the personal responsibility of the Chief of sub-headquarters, but in no case would it be taken out of the office.
The Execution of the Akritas Plan
The primary concern of Makarios was that Turkey, as a guarantor power, be prevented from interfering with the steps that the Greek Cypriot side would be taking to move towards a declaration of enosis. If this could be achieved, it would not be difficult for the Greeks of the island to impose by force their will on the Turkish Cypriots, one of the two co-founders of the joint state. The device developed to forestall any such intervention would be the manipulation of the world public opinion. The Akritas Plan, therefore, was based on gradualism, to persuade target countries or group of countries that the constitution of Cyprus, based on international agreements, was unworkable with its system of checks and balances. Nothing could be easier to achieve. All Makarios needed to do was simply not to implement the basic provisions of the constitution, disregard the rulings of the Supreme Constitutional Court and deliberately create a deadlock. Then it would be possible to eliminate the Turkish Cypriot rights under the constitution, including the right to veto. Once the Greek side was in total control of the state and government machinery, it would move to repudiate the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance which gave Turkey the right to station a military contingent on the island and to intervene, unilaterally if necessary, in defense of the state of affairs created by the 1960 agreements. Finally, the Greek Cypriot side could stage a referendum and vote, in the absence of Turkish Cypriot constitutional rights and international agreements which prohibited it, for union of Cyprus with Greece. Enosis would have been achieved.
On 30 November 1963, Makarios started the execution of the Akritas Plan by proposing a 13-point memorandum for the amendment of the constitution, in full knowledge of the fact that his proposals could not possibly be accepted by the Turkish Cypriots.
Article 182 of the 1960 constitution stated that,
"The Articles or parts of the Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February 1959, are the basic Articles of the Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal."
These Basic Articles included all the provisions which Makarios proposed to amend or abolish in his thirteen points. Therefore, all those proposals were in violation of the constitution which the Archbishop had accepted three years earlier.
"In short the amendments emasculated the Constitution of all those provisions which were of fundamental importance to the Turkish community and on which they relied to protect them from subordination…" (John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus-the British Connection)
Within three weeks of the 13-point memorandum, on 21 December 1963, the Greek armed onslaught against the Turkish Cypriots was launched. The Turkish Cypriot resistance could not be broken within 24 hours as planned. During the initial four days of the Greek Cypriot armed onslaught hundreds of Turkish Cypriots lost their lives. Nearly 30.000 Turkish Cypriots had to evacuate 103 villages, and characteristically, soon after their departure, the Greek Cypriots started burning down and demolishing their houses. The incidents which started in December 1963 went on until the end of 1967 in the form of armed conflicts. The Turkish Cypriot community perhaps lived its darkest days between December 1963 and the middle of 1968. During this period areas inhabited by Turkish Cypriots were placed under siege and a merciless economic blockade was imposed on those areas by the Greeks. During the period 1964 and 1967 Cyprus was virtually under the occupation of Greece through its 20.000 troops and officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard. In 1967 a second major attack was launched against the Turkish Cypriot Community with the object, once again, of bringing about the union of Cyprus with Greece. The 1967 crisis subsided as a result of Turkey's warning that it would intervene and the consequent undertaking by Greece to withdraw her forces from Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots, who were turned into an impoverished community without employment, without security and uncertain as to their future, continued their resistance with relief aid from Turkey. Harassment and armed attacks against Turkish Cypriots continued unabated until 1974. (Necati Münir Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute)
Let us conclude by returning briefly to our dark character at the beginning, George Grivas, who had left the island in 1967, but returned clandestinely once again in September 1971 and established the criminal EOKA B organization which committed murders and many other crimes to advance the enosis cause. The unconstitutional Greek Cypriot National Guard, staffed and controlled by Greek officers, became the main supplier of men and material to EOKA B.
On 15 July 1974 the Greek/Greek Cypriot coup took place, installing another character from the Akritas Plan, the notorious terrorist and self-confessed murderer Nicos Sampson as the president of Cyprus.
"I was about to proclaim enosis when I quit" he would boast later on, if the Turkish intervention had not taken place. The barbarity committed at Atlılar, Sandallar and Muratağa villages and the massacre of the Turkish males who were picked up from Taşkent, Terazi and Mari and lined up and shot are glaring examples of what lay in store for the Turkish Cypriot people had not the Turkish intervention taken place. (Necati Münir Ertekün, In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement)
"The root of the evil is very deep," Makarios would state before the Security Council, "reaching as far as Athens. It is from there that the tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the Greek Cypriot people are tasting today, is being fed and maintained and helped to grow and spread."
That must have been the only time he remembered that he was speaking for the Greek Cypriots only and such a thing as the people of Cyprus never existed. Understandably, he never mentioned the Akritas Plan.
The Akritas Plan is older than the Cyprus question it created 37 years ago. It became the blueprint guiding all Greek and Greek Cypriot policies and actions in and outside the island from 1963 to 1974. During that time, it came close to achieving its declared objectives, at the expense of Turkish Cypriot lives, especially with regard to the scheme of international deception and manipulation lying at the core of the Akritas Plan. From this perspective, it reads like a fresh Greek Cypriot document. To understand why Cyprus became a problem for nearly four decades and why a comprehensive settlement still remains so elusive, one should read the Akritas Plan as if it was drafted yesterday. Because one of the authors and executioners of that plan is the Greek Cypriot president in the south of the island who admits in his memoirs that "Just as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish Cypriot preoccupation was to defeat any such effort and to maintain the partnership concept, which in their opinion the Zurich Agreement created between the two communities. The conflict, therefore, was a conflict of principle and for that principle both sides were prepared to go on arguing and even, if need be, to fight, rather than compromise. That same principle is still in conflict, even today…"
What Clerides fails to mention is that the Greek Cypriot preoccupation, enunciated in the Akritas Plan, was unlawful, illegitimate and unjust. It was by no means an innocent intellectual preoccupation, but one which created the grand deception and led to inhuman consequences, the attempted extermination of all those who lawfully, legitimately and justly opposed that preoccupation.
What is perhaps of more immediate concern is the admission of Clerides that the "same principle is still in conflict, even today", between the Greek Cypriots who contend that "Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state", prepared to fight rather than compromise, and the Turkish Cypriots who wish "to maintain the partnership concept" created through international agreements four decades ago.
On 12 September 2000, the United Nations Secretary-General made a statement, opening a new round of proximity talks in New York between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot parties. The Secretary-General, in his statement, spoke of "negotiations in which each represents its side -and no one else- as the political equal of the other" and "a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership", concluding that "the equal status of the parties must and should be recognized explicitly in the comprehensive settlement which will embody the results of the detailed negotiations required to translate this concept into clear and practical provisions."
These so obvious basic requirements voiced by the Secretary-General created a familiarly negative and aggressive reaction on the Greek Cypriot part accompanied by a pandemonium in the Greek and Greek Cypriot press. Clerides and his entourage of Greek Cypriot political party leaders in New York threatened to break off the proximity talks, deploying tactics designed to force the Secretary-General to dilute or withdraw his statement. Why the Greek Cypriot side once again displayed its symptomatic reactions should be clear to the readers of this real-life story. The Secretary-General was speaking of a new partnership to be arrived at through negotiations in which each represented its side -and no one else- as the political equal of the other and he had concluded that the equal status of the parties must and should be recognized explicitly in the comprehensive settlement. These were in direct conflict with the Greek Cypriot policy of disregarding and, if possible, discarding the Turkish Cypriots, as described so long ago in the Akritas Plan.
It is certainly as shocking as this condemned document itself to realize that Clerides and others running the Greek Cypriot entity continue to speak the language and act in the spirit of that grand deception, the Akritas Plan.
This realization is what makes me to return each August over the years to that memorial on the lonely plain, on the way to the eastern coastline of the island. Wondering about the subtle change in the August weather is just an innocent preoccupation while I walk around in the silence of early morning. Going over the names on the marble, I know I shall come face to face with Yüksel Arif, a child of ten, who would have been 36 today. And I don't know how to tell him that the grand deception still goes on, the same deception that denied him his life.