Dr. Andrew MANGO
Former Head of B.B.C. (British Broadcasting Corporation) South Europe and French Language Services

At its meeting in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999, the Council of Ministers of the EU declared that "the Union should be in a position to welcome new member states from the end of 2002...". The (Greek-controlled) Republic of Cyprus (ROC) is one of these states, since the EU promised in 1995 "to incorporate Cyprus in the next stage of its development". In the Helsinki Declaration the Council of Ministers underlined that "a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union". But, it added: "If no settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council's decision's on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors."

The most important relevant factor is, surely, the de facto situation on the island. Contact between the Greek and Turkish communities was severed in December 1963. Since 1974, the communities have regrouped in two ethnically homogeneous areas, where they have ruled themselves in a stable and democratic manner. There are de facto two separate states in Cyprus.

The second relevant factor is that there are no examples of the reconstitution of multiethnic societies, after these have broken up into separate ethnic components. True, the international community is trying hard to reconstruct multiethnic societies in Bosnia and Kosovo. But results have been meagre.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Union has set itself a limited aim: to form a weak central government and allow the federated states a maximum of self-rule. But even within one of these federated states, which, to complicate matters, is itself a federation of Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians, the EU has not been able to reunify the city of Mostar. There is some progress, but it is both limited and slow. It is proving impossible to revive the past pattern of ethnic settlement.

In Kosovo, the situation is worse. Not only have the international authorities on the ground been unable to re-establish former settlement patterns, but the geographical separation of the two main ethnic communities is becoming ever more pronounced.

So much for the two attempts to reverse the flow of history -a flow which in the last two centuries has moved steadily in the direction of homogeneous nation states.

Elsewhere the realities produced by conflict have been accepted: Germans are not returning to Czech Sudetenland or to western Poland, Muslim and Hindus refugees are not moving back across the partition line in the Indian sub-continent; Palestinian refugees are not returning to what has become Israel.

The third relevant factor is that a federation - the system of government which the international community has in mind for Cyprus - requires the support of the inhabitants of its constituent parts. Where it is lacking, the federation breaks up. This has happened in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere.

As President Denktas has said "a federation is the end of the road - not the beginning". In other words, communities which are to come together in a federation must first of all develop the will to federate. The UN formula that any solution of the Cyprus problem must be viable and acceptable to both sides takes cognisance of this fact. The Greek foreign minister Papandreou has said that he did not want a successful divorce in Cyprus, but a happy marriage. A marriage cannot be valid, let alone happy, without mutual consent. At present this consent in lacking in Cyprus: the Greeks, who violated the 1960 Cyprus constitution in order to gain full control of a unitary state, have accepted a federal solution, at least for the time being. The Turks want a confederation of two sovereign states in Cyprus.

The fourth relevant factor is that a confederation of two initially sovereign Cyprus states does not preclude an eventual closer union. If a confederation functions well, it could lead to a federation.

The fifth relevant factor is that the absence of bloodshed in Cyprus, achieved since 1974, is a boon to be treasured. There has been no bloodshed because the island's inhabitants are secure in their lives, homes and property, and because men of violence have been kept apart. Any settlement which jeopardises this security would lead to a renewal of intercommunal violence. More specifically, any attempt to reunite Cyprus without a preliminary agreement on the borders of the two national areas, on reciprocal property claims and on the criteria of citizenship would be a recipe for conflict. People say "apply to Cyprus EU rules on freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, etc. without thinking what would follow. But the consequences are easy to predict. A Greek would cross the border, look at a house and say "This is my house". What do you expect to happen then? Would the Turkish Cypriot living in the house say "Come in and live here, I will go somewhere else"? Or will he say "What about my house on the other side of the island, where I shall never feel secure again?"? It is absolute nonsense to expect a peaceful resolution ofsurch arguments. So, if you want trouble, open the borders now, recognise all EU rights, freedom of employment, movement, settlement etc. and look at the outcome. "Look at the festival", as Turks would say. It will not be a pretty sight?

The sixth relevant factor is that, whatever construction the EU may place on the 1960 agreements, Greece and Turkey, as the two motherlands of the two Cyprus communities, must have an equal standing in Cyprus. Anyone who has been to Cyprus knows that there is no Cyprus nation. What is called a "Cyprus identity" is nothing more than a memory of eighty years of British rule. Otherwise, there is no Cyprus nation any more than there is a Cretan nation or a Lesbian nation - (on the Greek island of Lesbos/Mytilini). There are Greeks and there are Turks, and their two motherlands, Greece and Turkey: two peoples with different languages, cultures, history and aspirations. Unless both Greece and Turkey are members of the EU, the two communities in Cyprus cannot enjoy the equality which the international community promises them.

Today, Greece is a member of the EU. Turkey has only recently been designated a candidate for membership, with no date set for the beginning of membership negotiations. If Cyprus preceded Turkey in membership of the EU (an outcome which the current timetable presupposes), the two motherlands would have unequal access to the island, and equality between the two communities would be impossible. In other words, if Cyprus became a member of the EU at a time when Turkey would still not be a member, any Greek from the mainland would be able to go to Cyprus, buy property, settle and start a business there. Turks from the mainland would not enjoy any of these rights, unless there were special provisions, which, however, would be difficult to reconcile with basic EU rules.

This would upset the balance between the two communities established by the 1960 agreements under which an independent Cyprus Republic was set up. According to Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus undertook not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever. Article 50 of the Cyprus Constitution gave the Turkish Vice-President the right to veto the membership of Cyprus in any international organisation, unless both Greece and Turkey were members. EU lawyers have expended a great deal of ingenuity in arguing that these legal provisions do not invalidate the application for full membership of the EU made by the Cyprus government without the approval of the elected leadership of the Turkish community. But no amount of ingenuity could disguise the fact that the consequences of Cypriot membership at a time when Turkey is not a member of the EU would run counter to the spirit of the 1960 agreements.

Most inhabitants of Cyprus, whether Greek or Turkish, would like to become citizens of the EU. Professor Dodd has given us a high estimate of their number. But Turkish Cypriots desire also security and equality. They can achieve both within the EU only if Turkey became a full member and not otherwise.

By designating Turkey as a candidate in Helsinki, the EU has implicitly declared its belief that Greece and Turkey can establish the kind of relations which two member states must entertain with each other. A dialogue has begun between the two countries, and, at the time of writing, just now, some peripheral agreements have been reached. It is to be hoped that the two countries will also reach an agreement on Cyprus which would be acceptable to the two communities on the island or, more properly, that the two communities will be able to agree among themselves and that their two motherlands, Greece and Turkey, would thus see their conflict over Cyprus resolved. Until this happens, the best course is for Greece and Turkey to put the problem of Cyprus to one side, and pursue agreement in other areas. In practice, this is what is happening at the present time. Several years ago, Greece and Turkey had agreed on a similar approach at a meeting in Davos. But "the spirit of Davos" soon evaporated, as the Greek government, for domestic political reasons, tried to drag in the problem of Cyprus. Now too, in spite of a realistic decision to put aised intractable problems, there is always the danger that continued disagreement in Cyprus may involve the two motherlands and thus negate the purpose of the EU in granting candidate status to Turkey.

There must be consistency in the aims which the EU sets itself. That is important. This, surely, is the most relevant factor which the Council of Ministers will have to bear in mind as it pursues its negotiations with the Greek-controlled Republic of Cyprus. Accepting Cyprus as a members state in advance for a settlement would create problems both in Greek-Turkish relations and in the new relationship between the EU and Turkey. If the EU wants Greece and Turkey to get on, if it wants to see Turkey eventually as a member, and in any case as a constructive partner, it should at least delay accepting the Greek part of Cyprus into the fold of full membership. Otherwise, the EU would negate its own purposes.

A Cyprus settlement needs a great deal of time. Instead of pressing for a quick settlement, the EU (and the international community) should seek preliminary agreements (on borders, property, de facto mutual recognition, etc.), until, with the passage of time, the wish for a closer association develops in both parts of Cyprus.

In the meantime there are steps which can usefully be taken to reduce tension in Cyprus. One such step would be the creation of a permanent liaison committee on which the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would be represented. If this were done, meetings between the two sides would not have to be arranged ad hoc by the United Nations. A UN official could, if necessary, chair a permanent liaison committee. The committee would deal with current problems and also seek to eliminate obstacles between the two communities. There have been several meetings, lots of meetings, between private citizens from the two communities - businessmen, trade-unionists, politicians (usually opposition politicians), etc.. The time has come for authorities from the two sides to come together on a regular basis. A permanent liaison committee would foster habits of working together without which no federation or even confederation could function. True, the representation in the liaison committee of the two sets of authorities on the island, would imply mutual de facto recognition. But even the current proximity talk cany this implication, for they would have been both impossible and in any case pointless unless Presidents derides and Denktas recognised each other as the leaders of their respective communities. Otherwise, why meet? You meet someone because he is the leader of a community with which you would like to reach an agreement. Since there is already a degree ofde facto recognition, one can go a step further and establish a standing body. A permanent liaison committee, which would embody this existing implicit recognition, could become with time the nucleus of a confederal and, if intercommunal confidence allowed it, eventually of a federal government.

The reduction of antagonism between national communities requires a great deal of time. Europe has waited for more than 50 years for Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany to begin thinking of an association which would allow their respective citizens to own property in each other's country. More than a century after the Schleswig-Holstein dispute between Germany and Denmark, there are still restrictions which apply to Germans wishing to settle north of the border. So, the idea that communities which have fallen apart, can come together again tomorrow happily without any problems is not only unwise; it is dangerous. It is a recipe for trouble. Whole generations must pass, before memories of conflict - particularly if there has been a bloodshed - can be forgotten and a new spirit can arise. There is no comparison with the reunification of Germany. Germans on both sides of the border were kept apart forcibly by Communist rule. They were one nation, which reunited once the Russian army - the force which had kept them apart - had departed. In Cyprus there are clearly two nations and the Turkish side wants the continued protection of the Turkish army. So there is no similarity between people who had been artificially kept apart and people who want to stay apart in order to be free and safe in their homes. Two conclusions follow from this premise:

First, any attempt to hurry the process would be self-defeating, and any arrangements based on the false presumption that antagonism no longer existed would be built on sand, and

Second, transitional arrangements are needed to keep the peace and foster habits of cooperation while antagonism gradually simmers down.

I am not content, however, with the pessimist observation that Greeks and Turks in Cyprus cannot be reunited today. What I want to stress is that in the meantime one must reduce the danger of antagonism, and set up a mechanism to reduce tension, while recognising facts on the ground. More generally, one must stop Cyprus being a bomb which could explode at any moment. The destructive potential of the Cyprus dispute is greater than its intrinsic value. It is a danger to world peace. Some years ago, a Greek Cypriot politician was quoted as saying: "I do not want Cyprus to start a third world war. But if that is the price for winning our just cause, so be it". Well, this is not a price which any of us should be willing to pay. We do not want Cyprus to start a world war, or even a Greek-Turkish war. So measures are needed now to defuse the bomb. I suggest that the creation of a permanent liaison committee bringing together the representatives of Greek and Turkish authorities on the island would serve to defuse it.

I believe that the EU should facilitate such transitional arrangements, instead of forcing the issue by accepting as a full member a divided country. Recently there have been some signs of realism: President Denktas has been received by the German Foreign Minister; the fact that the government of the Republic f Cyprus does not rule the Turks on the island has been admitted. On the other hand, as we have seen, pressure is continued to be brought on the Turks in Cyprus to enter negotiations against their will and against their interests. The sooner this approach is abandoned, the better. This does not mean renouncing the aim of accepting into the Union the whole island of Cyprus, but postponing it until the population of the island reaches agreement on its future governance. For, in the last resort, the EU cannot decide what kind of Cyprus it is to accept within its ranks. Only the people of Cyprus, Greeks and Turks, defined pragmatically as the permanent residents of the island, can take this decision.

Thank you, I will stop there.