General

Maintaining peace and security in Europe is of great importance.

, as a European Ally in NATO, has made a significant contribution to peace and stability in Europe during the Cold War years. Subsequently, she has supported the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), as well as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the EU. She continued her support as this policy was renamed “Common Security and Defence Policy” as the Lisbon Treaty took effect in 2009. This support has been the result of a strategic decision taken by

from the outset.

’s unwavering commitment and full support to CSDP is not only a direct derivation of her accession process to the EU, but also a natural reflection of its general approach of supporting initiatives that would contribute to regional and international peace and security. It is also consistent with her multi-faced foreign policy.

has put this support into practice by substantially contributing to the activities, missions and operations of the EU in the field of defense and security.

On the other hand,

also strongly supports the strategic cooperation between NATO and the EU. This approach is a natural result of

’s policy which enhances peace and stability as a member state of NATO and a candidate for EU membership. Within this context,

believes that the principles guiding this cooperation should ensure mutual support, complementarity and transparency.

also participates in the efforts to improve cooperation between the two organizations in line with the framework of strategic partnership between NATO and the EU agreed in 2002-2003.

Background

Initially,

’s contributions were based on her acquired rights and status in the Western European Union. These endeavors bore fruit with the signing of the Ankara Document in December 2001. This document was negotiated by

, the UK and USA and addressed the participation of non-EU European Allies in ESDP. Ankara Document was approved by NATO Heads of States and Governments at the Brussels Summit in 24-25 October 2002. This new document titled as “the Nice Implementation Document”, the North Atlantic Council Decision of December 13, 2002 and NATO-EU Joint Declaration of December 16, 2002 constitute essentially the framework of cooperation between NATO and the EU. That framework was made official by the exchange of letters between NATO Secretary General and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Secretary General / High Representative in 2003.

has welcomed the establishment of a strategic partnership between the two organizations. Such a strategic partnership, based on the principle of the indivisibility of security, and increased synergy and coherence between NATO and the EU in addressing common threats enables joint efforts for peace and security.

believes that it is incumbent upon all Allies and European partners to fully implement and make best use of this agreed framework.

The Istanbul Summit held on 28-29 June 2004 witnessed another step forward in terms of NATO-EU cooperation at the operational level. NATO announced its decision to terminate Operation Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina while confirming its continued presence in that country by keeping an HQ. Simultaneously, the EU launched operation EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities based upon the “Berlin plus” arrangements. While enabling recourse to NATO assets and capabilities and being spearheaded by the EU, this operation was going to be a successful test for NATO-EU cooperation. Despite these developments, there are some issues that remain problematic between NATO and the EU.

The existing modalities of cooperation between NATO and the EU were premised on a certain balance, envisaging the development of a mutual culture of transparency and cooperation, NATO support to the development of ESDP, as well as a significant degree of involvement of non-EU European Allies in ESDP activities. Needless to say, the latter was to be done so with due regard to the principle of autonomy of decision making of the EU, arguably an equally essential notion for NATO.

The EU and NATO both followed up on their commitment to prepare the basis for their strategic cooperation, which was never meant to be limited to Berlin (+) activities as we are often misled to believe today. While the agreed framework for strategic partnership was established in 2003 with an exchange of letters, building the above-mentioned mutual culture of openness and transparency was something that could only be realized and measured in time[1].

Today, there is a clear imbalance in the degree of transparency and openness accorded by NATO to the EU (as well as to other actors and NATO Partners) and the narrow interpretation that the EU strictly abides by when it comes to its dealings with NATO. The same restrictive philosophy on the part of the EU prevails in the involvement of non-EU European Allies in ESDP activities. Reinstating this necessary balance which was disturbed over time to the disadvantage the non-EU European Allies is indispensible, not only because of contractual obligations, but more so in order to realize the objectives of a Comprehensive Approach. NATO’s 21 EU member Allies bear particular responsibility in this regard.

A meaningful level of involvement in ESDP activities, is essential for a non-EU European Ally like

, particularly given her substantial contributions to ESDP activities, as well as the fact that many ESDP activities have been undertaken in geographic proximity to

and/or could have potential security implications for

[2].

The EU’s treatment of the non-EU European Allies in the context of ESDP activities is far from fulfilling the remit of the Nice European Council’s Presidency Conclusions (2000) and its implementation document (Nice Implementation Document of 2002).

It is quite revealing to compare and contrast the way in which NATO treats its Partners, with the approach of the EU. NATO has been able to develop a culture of listening to its Partners and addressing their concerns. Partner requests are not dismissed under legalistic guises. Moreover, Partners’ contributions are appreciated, and their concerns, if any, are by definition deemed legitimate. This inclusive attitude prevailing within NATO is also the requirement of a Comprehensive Approach. It is reflected in NATO policies, not only in word, but also in deed. The Political-Military Framework (PMF) Document, forming the basis for Partners’ involvement in Allied operations has from the outset been regarded as a progressive tool, rather than a restrictive one. Its implementation is assessed on an annual basis, according to our Partner’s observations and experiences. It is on such a basis that genuine improvements have been made in NATO’s openness to its Partners. This has a direct bearing on the success of NATO’s undertakings, including in the Balkans and Afghanistan. It is also a clear testament of NATO’s sensitivity to the safety and security of Partners’ troops taking part in NATO operations.

The same logic does not guide the EU as regards enabling involvement of the non-EU European NATO members in ESDP activities. The EU document regarding non-EU European Allies, the Nice Implementation Document, has consistently been interpreted in a narrow manner. In effect, the EU has preferred to use it as a restrictive tool, rather than a mutually beneficial, progressive one. There is no process in place to assess its implementation and enhance it, as is the case in NATO. Moreover, even its existing provisions are not fully implemented. For example, in the planning and conduct of operations within NATO, contributing Partner involvement has reached a much advanced stage. Today, Partners are able to see and comment on basic operational documents, at a very early stage. At times, this happens concurrently with Allies. The situation within the EU is, to put it in the mildest terms, incomparable.[3] There is dire need for renovated thinking in the EU.

Most of the shortcomings highlighted above have implications for all non-EU European Allies. While there are some additional concerns specific to

. Suffice it to say, however, that

is a hard and soft security provider at a geo-strategic location of significant relevance for the EU. She is also a NATO Ally willing and able to provide considerable support for ESDP undertakings. The consideration that is justifiably given within NATO to the need to be open and transparent with Partners contributing to Alliance operations should be of relevance to the EU as well.

However, EU’s treatment of non-EU European Allies in the context of CSDP activities is far from fulfilling the remit and the philosophy of the Nice European Council’s Presidency Conclusions (2000) and its implementation document (Nice Implementation Document of 2002). Furthermore, despite its commitments, the EU has neither finalized cooperation arrangements between

and the European Defence Agency, nor signed an agreement for exchange of classified information with

, due to the objection of some EU members. ( including Cyprus)

(As for Cyprus, we will not allow anything that will change the state of affairs, including in NATO-EU relations.

We may have a solution early next year in Cyprus. In such a case, a brand-new page on NATO-EU strategic partnership would be just one of the benefits in the larger picture.

But if there is no movement in Cyprus and if there is no movement on

’s concerns in the EU with regard to our participation in the Common Security and Defense Policy, no further movement should be expected on the NATO-EU dossier.)

European Defense Agency (EDA)

The history of EDA goes to EuroGroup and Independent European Programme Group which were essentially NATO Committees transferred from NATO to Western European Union (WEU). Resulting from its vested right of NATO membership; while

was a partner in WEU, she had enjoyed full membership to Western European Armament Union (WEAO) and Western European Armament Group (WEAG) within WEU.

In the meeting of Defense Ministers of WEAG held in 2004 in Brussels, it was decided to terminate WEAG by the end of June 2005 and to transfer its duties to the recently established EDA within the EU. Albeit we knew that without being an EU member, it was not possible to join in EDA with full membership rights, the decision of termination of WEAG/WEAO has been approved within the framework of EU promises on the enactment of the arrangements of cooperation between our country and NATO. In general terms, this EU promises is also registered in the Joint Action Document of EDA.

On the other side, the implementation document which would constitute the base of the relations between

and EDA has come to the stage of coming into force (together with the implementation document for Norway who was in a similar situation with our country); yet, Greek Cypriots have hindered the approval of the aforementioned document at the EU meeting at the technical level, held on 14 April 2005 in Brussels, by emphasizing it was based on “political considerations”.

The approval of the implementation document which would establish the relations between

and EDA would help contribute to the development of European defense capabilities. The EU is yet to honor its commitments. This is not only about complying with the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda but also a necessity for a fruitful cooperation between NATO and the EU in the field of capacity building.